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Complementary, Not Competing, 
Claims of Law and Religion:
An Islamic Perspective 
Abdullahi A. An-Nacim* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
II.   ISLAM, STATE, AND POLITICS
III.   SHARIA AND STATE LAW
IV.   PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY THROUGH NORMATIVE 
PLURALISM AND LEGAL UNIFORMITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Whatever view any of us has about the relationship between law and 
religion is founded on a certain conception of law in relation to a specific 
understanding of a particular religion.1  Whether we accept the possibility of 
mutual influence, or influence by either normative system on the other, 
would be premised on our particular expectation of what that influence 
might be.  In other words, our view of this relationship is always based on 
our knowledge and experience of our own legal and religious normative 
systems, and not on an abstract conception of law or of religion.  This will 
be the case whether we are supportive or critical of those normative systems.  
Moreover, some of us may claim or assume that our views of the 
 *  Charles Howard Chandler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law; Ph.D. in 
Law, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 1976; Diploma. in Criminology, University of Cambridge, 
England, 1973; LL.B., University of Cambridge, England, 1973; LL.B., University of Khartoum, 
Sudan, 1970.  This Article is a part of Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 
conference entitled, The Competing Claims of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom?
Substantial portions of this Article are derived from my earlier works, as noted in each Part. 
 1.  For a similar discussion, see Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics: Separate but 
Interactive, (Jan. 29, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2007/0217islamic% 
20world/2007islamforum_an%20naim.pdf [hereinafter An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics] (a 
substantially revised version of Abdullahi A. An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation: Is an 
Islamic State Possible or Viable?, in 5 Y.B.. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 29 (Eugene Cotran & Chibli 
Mallat eds., 2000) [hereinafter An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation]). 
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relationship between law and religion are supported by what we think we 
know about other legal and religious normative systems.   
There is no possibility for human comprehension, reflection, and 
communication about the relationship of law and religion that is not 
premised on some specific view of law and of religion.  However critical we 
are of law, and whatever belief we hold about religion, that can only be of 
those institutions as we know and experience them.  In other words, it is 
never about law and religion in the abstract, but always about a specific view 
of particular legal and religious traditions, as viewed through the inherently 
limited experience of human beings.  Since this cannot be exhaustive or 
conclusive of all religious and legal traditions, we should accept the 
possibility of alternative views of the relationship between law and religion 
in different contexts.  
In this light, I propose to argue for the following propositions about the 
relationship between law and religion.  First, we should all be open to re-
considering our view of this relationship for different conceptions of law and 
experiences of religion.  Second, we should accept the possibility of dynamic 
change and transformation of any legal system or religious tradition.2  As 
clearly indicated by the historical evolution of legal systems and religious 
traditions, these institutions are always changing, though not always in 
predictable or predetermined ways.  Although one cannot predict or preempt 
how these institutions will evolve, I am unable to see how one can rationally 
assert that this or that is the way this legal system or that religion are to be 
for eternity.  Third, and most importantly, locating the human agency of 
citizens and believers at the core of both law and religion, respectively, 
indicates possibilities of mutual influence to the ends of upholding 
individual freedom and social justice for all.  When people are free to make 
and change the law as they wish and practice the religion they choose as 
they understand it, they are more likely to seek and progressively realize a 
humane view of law and an enlightened view of religion. 
There is of course nothing inevitable about these outcomes, but the 
question for me is a matter of moral choice and of political action by citizens 
and believers as human subjects.  This Article’s task is to explore and clarify 
what this approach means for law and religion from an Islamic perspective 
in the historical and present context of Islamic societies.  The premise of my 
argument in this Article is that every law enforcement system should be 
founded on compliance by the general population as the norm, in order to be 
able to deal with violations as exceptional.  Otherwise, the system will not 
have the necessary political support, and human and material resources to 
cope with massive and persistent violations of its norms.  The challenge for 
 2.  See id. at 6. 
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every legal system is to draw on ethical as well as pragmatic or utilitarian 
bases of large scale and consistent compliance without surrendering its own 
autonomy and political accountability to the totality of the population.  
There are many possible sources of support for compliance among the 
population at large, but religion is certainly one of the strongest historical, as 
well as contemporary, bases of the motivation for believers to comply with 
legal norms. 
The reality of mutual influence of law and religion is due to the 
normative overlap between these two normative systems, in that they both 
seek to regulate human behavior through similar ethical sanctions.  For 
instance, to steal is both a crime and a sin at the same time, but it is not a 
crime because it is a sin, and it is not a sin because it is a crime.  Although 
they apply to the same human conduct, these are two separate 
characterizations, based on different rationales and leading to different 
outcomes.  The fact that legal and religious norms may relate to the same 
human conduct creates the false impression that they are competing, but the 
different sources, nature, and consequences of the underlying authority of 
these two domains indicate the opposite.  Despite apparent perceptions of 
competing claims, we should see the complementarity and interdependence 
of law and religion in that the law needs religious sanction to legitimize the 
coercive authority of the law, while religion needs the coercive authority of 
the law to protect peace, social justice, and cohesion among all citizens 
equally, believers and non-believers alike. 
For this view of mutual influence of law and religion to be persuasive 
for non-believers, complementarity and interdependence can mean neither 
the permanent exclusion of religious norms from the possibility of legal 
enforcement nor their legal enforcement simply because they are religious 
norms.  There is a realm of legitimate interaction between legal and religious 
norms, for instance, when a religious norm indicates social disapproval 
among believers, thereby raising the demand or expectation for civil 
authorities to punish the conduct.  This is part of the broader interaction of 
ethnical and cultural norms, social practices, and legal sanction among most 
human societies.  The problem emerges when religious disapproval is the 
sole basis of legal sanction, like when a sin is automatically deemed to be a 
crime, without requiring additional reasons to justify the need for legal 
punishment.  Although the distinction between a crime and a sin may vary 
from one society to another, and for the same society over time, the need for 
this distinction is clear for all societies.  For instance, to lie is a sin, but 
additional harm or injury must be shown to follow before a lie should be 
punished as a crime.  This Article will explore a theory of law and Islam for 
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clarifying the criteria and process through which a sin may become a crime, 
without claiming to specify or determine how that should be done in all 
Islamic societies. 
In particular, I am concerned with the relationship between the positive 
law of the postcolonial state on the one hand, and Sharica as the normative 
system of Islam on the other.  By the term “law” I mean law that is made 
and enforced by the state, in contrast to Sharica which is the expression of 
religious norms as understood and practiced by believers.  The premise of 
my argument is that Sharica, by its nature and purpose, can only be freely 
observed by believers, and its principles lose their religious authority and 
value when enforced by the state.  It is from this fundamentally religious 
perspective that the state must not be allowed to claim the authority of Islam, 
regardless of whether or not such claims are made by ruling elites.  As I 
have previously noted in my other work, on the one hand, the functions of 
the state, including adjudication among competing claims of religious and 
secular authorities, are secular functions of a political institution that should 
not be allowed to claim religious authority.  Since whatever standards or 
mechanisms are imposed by the organs of the state to determine official 
policy and formal legislation will necessarily be based on the human 
judgment of those who control those institutions, state policy and legislation 
should not be misrepresented as “religious.”  This is what I refer to as the 
separation of Islam and the state.  On the other hand, the religious beliefs of 
Muslims, whether as officials of the state or private citizens, tend to 
influence their actions and political behavior.  I refer to this reality as the 
connectedness of Islam and politics.3 
Part of the difficulty is that the apparently dominant discourse about 
Islamic societies today assumes a simplistic notion that there is something 
called an Islamic state that is authorized to “enforce” the totality of Sharica.4 
This view tends to lay the burden of proof on those who oppose the claim of 
an Islamic state, as if this is the historical theological truth.  To the best of 
my knowledge, it is not only that there has never been agreement among 
Muslim scholars in the past or opinion leaders at present on what constitutes 
an “Islamic state,” but there is no theoretical possibility of that happening in 
the future.  The Qur’an and Sunna (traditions of the Prophet) never mention 
the term “state” a single time, let alone offer any guidance on defining it.5  
There is, of course, strong emphasis on justice and good governance, but 
there is no mention of particular models of how that might be achieved. The 
Qur’an and Sunna speak to believers as human beings, and never address an 
 3.  See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE: NEGOTIATING THE 
FUTURE OF SHARICA 4–6 (2008) [hereinafter AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE]. 
 4.  See An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5.  See generally QUR’AN (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
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institution.6  When texts of the Qur’an or Sunna refer to a collective entity, 
they do so in terms of a community of believers, not a “believing 
community.”  Muslims were, of course, ruled by states throughout history, 
and many rulers of those states sought religious legitimization, but they did 
not claim to establish “an Islamic state.”7  When we consider the two 
modern states that claimed this for the first time in Muslim history, namely 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we find that 
the founding doctrine of each state is deemed to be a heresy by the founding 
doctrine of the other state.  There is simply no way of deciding, from an 
Islamic point of view, whether either of the two (the Twelever’s Shia 
doctrine of Iran or the Wahabi doctrine of Saudi Arabia) is valid, simply 
because religious truth cannot be determined by political means or majority 
vote.  
Once we step away from such absolute claims of an Islamic mandate for 
the enforcement of Sharica by the state, we can find ample opportunities for 
collaboration between Sharica and state law as complementary, rather than 
competing normative domains.8  This can be done through normative 
pluralism in communities within the framework of uniformity of the legal 
system of the state9.  Briefly stated, this means that Muslims may live in 
accordance with their voluntary compliance with Sharica, but also subject to 
the safeguards of constitutionalism, human rights and equal citizenship for 
all as enforced by the state.  This is not a matter of preference of state law 
over religious law, but rather is the consequence of the fact that religious law 
is no longer religious when coercively enforced by the state.  In contrast, 
Sharica retains its religious quality when observed voluntarily with the intent 
to comply, but this cannot be imposed on others through the coercive 
authority of the state.  Another element of the proposed approach is the 
possibility of jurisprudential influence of Sharica on state law, provided that 
it is adopted through the normal lawmaking process and that it is subject to 
constitutional safeguards.10  To introduce that possibility, I will first explain 
the related concepts of Islam, state and politics, and I will try to clarify the 
 6.  See id. at 42:38 (“[R]espond to their Lord and keep up the prayer; conduct their affairs by 
mutual consultation; give to others out of what We have provided for them.”). 
 7.  See An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 7. 
 8.  For a discussion of Sharica, see AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3. 
 9.  For further discussion on normative pluralism, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, Religious 
Norms and Family Law: Is It Legal or Normative Pluralism?, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 785, 790–91 
(2011) [hereinafter An-Nacim, Religious Norms]. 
 10.  See id. at 807. 
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dynamic relationship between Sharica and state law within the framework of 
the modern concept of self-determination. 
II.  ISLAM, STATE, AND POLITICS11 
The proponents of “an Islamic state” tend to cite the Prophet’s state in 
Medina (622–632 AD) as the historical model of the implementation of 
Sharica in the life of the community; however, that experience was too 
exceptional to be relevant as a model for the modern state and the present 
postcolonial world that is defined by global economic and political interde-
pendence and integration. Even at the extremely limited and exceptional 
context in which the Muslims of Medina lived, the implementation of 
Sharica in that instance was not done through practices of state legislation 
and administration that can be applied today.  Aside from the extraordinary 
fact of the actual existence of the Prophet, who continued to receive and 
explain revelation throughout that time, and his personal charisma and moral 
leadership, the Medina state was made of closely-knit tribal communities of 
highly-motivated new converts living within an extremely limited space.  
That experience was also based more on the moral authority of social 
conformity than on the coercive power of the state as experienced in other 
human societies, and it was a unique phenomenon that ended with the 
Prophet’s death.12  The historical experience and theological frame of 
reference we are dealing with in examining the relationship between Islam, 
state and politics is that of the rest of the history of Islamic societies, and not 
the exceptional experience of the Prophet in Medina. 
While the term “Islamic state” may serve as shorthand for referring to 
states where Muslims constitute a clear majority of the population, the 
adjective “Islamic” logically applies to a people, rather than to a state as a 
political institution.  The term “Islamic state” is sometimes used to refer to 
those countries that have officially proclaimed Islam to be the state religion, 
or where Sharica is a formal source of legislation.  This characterization is 
misleading because such features do not accurately reflect an identifiable 
and verifiable “Islamic” quality of the state itself as a political institution.  
Unless one is willing to accept every claim by a state to be Islamic, the 
question becomes who has the authority to determine the quality of being 
Islamic and according to which criteria.  In terms of the example given 
earlier, the religious and political establishment of Saudi Arabia is unlikely 
to accept the claim of the present government of Iran that it is an “Islamic 
republic,” or even accept the notion of an Islamic republic.  From the Iranian 
 11.  Substantial portions of Part II are revised and unrevised excerpts from An-Nacim, Islam, 
State and Politics, supra note 1, and AN-NACIM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3. 
 12.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
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point of view, the Saudi monarchy is, by definition, un-Islamic and cannot 
possibly be legitimized by its purported commitment to the enforcement of 
Sharica.13 
The main points I wish to make regarding the relationship among Islam, 
state, and politics for present Islamic societies can be summarized as 
follows.  First, Islam and the state must be institutionally separate in order to 
safeguard the possibility of being Muslim out of personal conviction rather 
than conformity to the coercive will of the state.  The enforcement of Sharica 
through the coercive power or authority of the state is neither desirable nor 
possible in the modern context of a territorial nation-state.14  For instance, 
the Sharica system of dhimmihood, can be neither applied today to classify 
the population on the basis of religion, nor legitimately avoided because of 
its drastic and detailed legal consequences in every aspect of daily life.15  
The alternative view of the separation of Islam and the state would simply 
avoid the religious mandate claim, without excluding Islamic discourse from 
the public domain of policy and legislation, as I will briefly explain later.  I 
am calling for separation of Islam and the state, while maintaining the 
connectedness of Islam and politics, by distinguishing the state from politics 
by defining the state as the institutional continuity of sovereignty and 
politics as the government of the day.  The distinction, not dichotomy, is 
between the institutions of the state, like the Department of State, Justice 
Department, on the one hand, and Secretary of State, and Attorney General 
as members of the government of the day, on the other hand.  Succeeding 
governments with differing political mandates use the same institutions of 
the state to discharge their respective mandates without violating the 
autonomy and integrity of the institutions of the state, thereby enabling the 
next government to use the same departments to discharge its political 
mandate. 
The state is a complex web of organs, institutions, and processes that are 
supposed to implement the policies that are adopted through the political 
process of each society.  It signifies the continuity of institutions like the 
judiciary and administrative agencies, as distinguished from the government 
 13.  Id. at 17. 
 14.  Id. at 1. 
15.  Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, Beyond Dhimmihood: Citizenship and Human Rights, in 6 THE
NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM: MUSLIMS AND MODERNITY, CULTURE AND SOCIETY SINCE
1800, at 314 (Robert W. Hefner ed., 2010). 
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or regime of the day, which is the product of current politics.16  The state 
should therefore be the more settled and deliberately operational side of self-
governance, while politics is the dynamic process of making choices among 
competing policy options.  To fulfill that and other functions, the state must 
have what is known as a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, which is 
the ability to impose its will on the population at large.  This coercive power 
of the state, which is now more extensive and effective than ever before in 
human history, will be counterproductive when exercised in an arbitrary 
manner or for corrupt or illegitimate ends.  That is why it is critically 
important to keep the state as neutral as humanly possible, which requires 
constant vigilance by the generality of citizens, acting through a wide variety 
of political, legal, and other strategies and mechanisms.17 
The distinction between the state and politics assumes constant 
interaction among the organs and institutions of the state on the one hand, 
and organized political and social actors, and their competing visions of the 
public good on the other.  This distinction is also premised on an acute 
awareness of the risks of abuse or corruption that necessarily come with the 
coercive powers of the state.  The state should not be a complete reflection 
of daily politics because it must be able to mediate and adjudicate among the 
competing visions and policy proposals, which require it to remain relatively 
independent from different political forces in society.  But complete 
independence is not possible because of the political nature of the state, 
which cannot be totally autonomous from those political actors who control 
it.  This reality makes it necessary to strive for a degree of separation of the 
state from politics, so that those excluded by the political processes of the 
day can still resort to state organs and institutions for protection against the 
excesses and abuses of power by state officials.18 
This necessary balancing of competing claims and tense relationships 
can be mediated through principles and mechanisms of constitutionalism, 
rule of law, and the protection of the equal human rights of all citizens.  But 
these principles and institutions cannot succeed without the active and 
determined participation of at least significant majority of citizens, which is 
unlikely if people believe them to be inconsistent with those religious beliefs 
16.  GRAEME GILL, THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN STATE 2–3 (2003); 
GIANFRANCO POGGI, THE STATE: ITS NATURE, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 19–33 (Stanford
Univ. Press 1990). 
17.  GILL, supra note 16, at 17–20; see also An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 
2–3.
 18.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 2; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What 
Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 539–40 (2008) 
(“[For example], [t]he benefits [of interest groups] include supplying valuable information and 
advice for government actions and thus increasing the transparency of government, and creating a 
mechanism through which citizens can both participate in politics generally and influence specific 
government actions, all of which supports our representative form of government.”). 
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and cultural norms that influence their political behavior.  For example, the 
principles of popular sovereignty and democratic governance presuppose 
that citizens are sufficiently motivated and determined to participate in all 
aspects of self-governance, including participation in organized political 
action to hold their government accountable and responsive to their wishes.  
This motivation and determination is partly influenced by the religious 
beliefs and cultural conditioning of citizens.  In other words, it is necessary 
for believers to find some religious justification of constitutionalism and 
human rights as the necessary framework for regulating the public role of 
religion.19 
As I see it, the challenge facing Islamic societies today is how to 
separate Islam and the state despite the connectedness of Islam and politics.  
My objective is to affirm and support the institutional separation of Islam 
and the state as necessary for Sharica to have its proper positive and 
enlightening role in the lives of Muslims and Islamic societies.  This view 
can also be called “the religious neutrality of the state,” whereby state 
institutions neither favor nor disfavor any religious doctrine or principle.  
Such neutrality is necessary for ensuring and protecting the freedom of 
individuals in their communities to adopt, object to or modify any view of 
religious doctrine or principles.  I am therefore emphasizing the separation 
of Islam and the state in order to realize the purpose of Sharica, rather than to 
negate its central role in the lives of Muslims.20 
The context of the constant negotiation of the relationships among 
Islam, state, and politics in present Islamic societies is shaped by profound 
transformations in the political, social, and economic structures and 
institutions under which all Muslims live in community with other believers 
and nonbelievers today.  This context is also shaped by the internal political 
and social conditions of each society, including the internalization of 
externally inspired changes, whereby Islamic societies have continued to 
follow Western forms of state formation, education, social organization, and 
economic, legal, and administrative arrangements even after achieving 
political independence.  All present Islamic societies not only live within 
territorial states that are significantly integrated into global systems of 
economic, political, and security interdependence and cross-cultural 
influence, but have voluntarily continued to participate in these processes 
long after they have achieved political independence from European 
 19.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 20.  Id. at 3. 
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colonialism.  These realities require the corresponding safeguards of 
constitutionalism and human rights protection. 
Contrary to the claims of its proponents, a so-called Islamic state to 
enforce Sharica as positive legislation undermines the possibility of an 
Islamic way of life, not its realization, because it will have to be based on a 
particular view of Islam that is not accepted by some Muslims who are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state.  In other words, the repudiation of the 
dangerous illusion of an Islamic state to coercively enforce Sharica 
principles is necessary for the practical ability of Muslims and other citizens 
to live in accordance with their religious and other beliefs.  Ironically, the 
notion of an Islamic state that is asserted in the name of self-determination is 
a postcolonial idea that is premised on a European model of the state and a 
totalitarian view of law and public policy as instruments of social 
engineering by ruling elites.  Although the states that have historically ruled 
over Muslims did seek political legitimacy in a variety of ways, including 
through religion, they did not claim to be Islamic states.   
The proponents of a so-called Islamic state in the modern context seek 
to use the powers and institutions of the state, as constituted by European 
colonialism and continued after independence, to coercively regulate 
individual behavior and social relations in the specific ways selected by 
ruling elites.  It is particularly dangerous to attempt to implement such 
totalitarian models in the name of Islam because that would make it far more 
difficult to resist than when that is done by a secular state that does not claim 
religious legitimacy.  At the same time, the separation of religion and the 
state is not easy because the state will necessarily have to regulate the role of 
religion in order to maintain its own religious neutrality, which is necessary 
for the role of the state as mediator and adjudicator among competing social 
and political forces, as mentioned above.21 
In making my argument from an Islamic point of view, I remain 
convinced that succeeding generations of Muslims have always sought to 
discover what God had decreed or willed for them to do or be (hukm Allah), 
as they believe that to be the divine guidance for all aspects of their daily 
life.  But I also see that “Islamic jurisprudence is a speculative essay to 
comprehend the precise terms of Allah’s law.”22  It is reasonable to assume 
that generations of Muslims through the ages generally earnestly strove to 
live up to the ideals set by the Prophet and early generations of Muslims as a 
matter of personal conviction.  I am not concerned here with an assessment 
or evaluation of whether, and to what extent, any generation or group of 
Muslims have failed or succeeded in either discovering God’s decree or will 
 21.  Id. at 3–4. 
22.  NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 41 (1969). 
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regarding any matter, or whether and how they have managed to live up to 
that ideal from a sociological or anthropological point of view.  The question 
I am addressing here is whether it is possible for any state, however 
constituted and rationalized, to enforce Sharica through positive legislation.23 
Affirming the religious neutrality of the state does not mean that Islamic 
principles are irrelevant to law and public policy.  Indeed, Muslims can and 
should propose policy or legislation out of their religious or other beliefs, as 
all citizens have the right to do so, but must support such proposals in terms 
of “civic reason,” instead of simply asserting them as required by Sharica.  
By civic reason I mean the need for reasons of policy and legislation to be 
publicly declared, as well as that the process of reasoning on the matter 
should be open and accessible to all citizens.  In other words, the rationale 
and purpose of public policy or legislation must be based on the sort of 
reasoning that the generality of citizens can accept or reject, as well as make 
counterproposals to through public debate and without reference to religious 
belief or doctrine.  Civic reason and reasoning, and not personal beliefs and 
motivation, are necessary whether Muslims constitute the majority or 
minority of the population of the state, because even if Muslims are the 
predominant majority, they would not agree on what policy and legislation 
necessarily follow from their Islamic beliefs.24 
It is unrealistic and unwise to expect people to fully comply with the 
requirements of civic reason because such choices are made within the realm 
of inner motivation and intentions.  It is difficult to tell why people vote in a 
particular way or how they justify their political agenda to themselves or to 
their close associates.  But the objective should be to promote and encourage 
civic reasons and reasoning while diminishing the exclusive influence of 
personal religious beliefs over time.  The requirement of civic reasons and 
reasoning processes does not assume that people who control the state can 
be neutral.  On the contrary, this requirement must be the basis of the 
operation of the state precisely because people are likely to continue to act 
on personal beliefs or justifications.  The requirement to publicly and openly 
present justifications that are based on reasons that the general population 
can freely accept or reject will, over time, encourage and develop a broader 
consensus among the population at large, beyond the narrow religious or 
other beliefs of various individuals and groups.  Since the ability to present 
civic reasons and debate them publicly is already present in most societies, 
what I am calling for is the deliberate and incremental enhancement and 
 23.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 24.  Id. at 8–9. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:46 PM 
 
1242 
development of these processes and their underlying culture over time, 
rather than suggesting that this concept is completely absent now, or that it is 
expected to be fully realized immediately.25 
In conclusion of this section, what is at issue is whether Sharica can in 
fact be enforced as such by the state, as distinguished from voluntary 
compliance with its dictates by Muslims out of personal religious conviction 
or choice. The significance of this distinction can be seen in the difference 
between the formal legal prohibition of paying or taking interest for loans as 
a matter of economic and social policy, as opposed to refraining from 
engaging in such practices because they constitute usury (riba), which is 
prohibited for Muslims under Sharica.26  Another example is the difference 
between outlawing insurance contracts as too speculative or contingent, in 
contrast to personal abstention from engaging in these practices because they 
are not allowed to Muslims as speculative contracts with inherently 
uncertain outcomes (qharar).  The point here is to emphasize the difference 
between enforcing legal principles and rules in accordance with the constitu-
tional standards and legislative process of the country, regardless of their 
original source, as distinguished from enforcing them because that is 
required by Sharica as the will of God.  In my view, past or current claims or 
demands to enforce Sharica through legislation by the state are based on a 
historical fallacy, as that is inconsistent with the nature of Sharica itself and 
impossible for the state, as constituted today, in any country in the world. 27  
In other words, it is neither possible to conceive of this possibility in 
theoretical terms, nor is it true that such a model existed in the past so that it 
can be reenacted today.  The question then becomes what should the role of 
Sharica be in a modern-state society in its present global context?28 
III.  SHARIA AND STATE LAW29 
What came to be known among Muslims as Sharica was in fact the 
product of a very slow, gradual and spontaneous process of interpretation of 
the Qur’an, and a collection, verification, and interpretation of Sunna during 
 25.  Id. at 9–10. 
 26.  See QUR’AN, supra note 5, at 3:130. 
 27.  ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NAcIM, AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF ISLAM 
105 (2006) (“A state that seeks to enforce some general principles of Sharica regarding public affairs 
and governance would find it extremely difficult to fulfill its essential domestic and international 
functions in the present increasingly global context.”). 
 28.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 10. 
 29.  Substantial portions of Part III are revised and unrevised excerpts from An-Nacim, Islam, 
State and Politics, supra note 1, and An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1. 
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the first three centuries of Islam (the seventh to the ninth centuries AD).30  
This process took place among scholars and jurists who developed their own 
methodology for the classification of sources, derivation of specific rules 
from general principles, and so forth.  That technical aspect of their work 
came to be known as the “science of the foundations” or the “principles of 
human understanding of divine sources” (usul al-fiqh).   
As one would expect, there was much disagreement and disputation 
among those early scholars about the meaning and significance of different 
aspects of the sources with which they were working.  Moreover, although 
those founding scholars are generally accepted to have been acting 
independently from the political authorities of the time, their work could not 
have been in isolation from the prevailing conditions of their communities, 
in local as well as broader regional contexts.  Those factors must have also 
contributed to disagreements among the jurists and sometimes to differences 
in the views expressed by the same jurist from one time to another, as is 
reported of the changes in the view of Imam al-Shaf’i when he moved from 
Iraq to Egypt.  Even after those disagreements eventually evolved into 
separate schools of thought (madhahib), differences of opinion persisted 
among scholars of the same schools, as well as between different schools.31 
The significant question to ask here is, how can Sharica principles be 
divinely predetermined if they can only be discovered through human 
understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna?  “How is it possible for the jurist 
(faqih) to conclude at the end of a very empirical evaluation and research of 
facts and texts, that his conclusions constitute a transcendental and divine 
authority?”32  The obvious answer is that whatever ruling a jurist reaches 
remains a matter of human judgment and cannot constitute transcendental or 
divine authority.  Jurists or scholars, however highly respected they may be, 
and even if their views came to be universally accepted by Muslims 
everywhere (which of course has never happened for any of them), can only 
present their own views of what God has decreed on any matter. 
A distinction is commonly drawn in Islamic discourse between Sharica 
and fiqh.  “Sharica law is the product of legislation (Sharic), of which God is 
the ultimate subject (shric).  Fiqh law consists of legal understanding, of 
30. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NACIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 11–33 (1990) [hereinafter AN-NACIM,
ISLAMIC REFORMATION]; NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
 31.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 11–12; see also AN-NACIM, ISLAMIC 
REFORMATION, supra note 30, at 17–18. 
32.  Ebrahim Moosa, Allegory of the Rule (ukm): Law as Simulacrum in Islam?, 38 HIST.
RELIGIONS 1, 21 (1998). 
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which the human jurist is the subject (faqh).”33  This distinction can be 
useful in a technical sense because it indicates that some principles or rules, 
as compared to others, are more based on speculative thinking than textual 
support from the Qur’an and Sunna.  But this does not mean that those 
principles that are taken to be Sharica, rather than fiqh, are the direct product 
of revelation because the Qur’an and Sunna cannot be understood or have 
any influence on human behavior except through the effort of fallible human 
beings.34 
Although the law is of divine provenance, the actual construction of 
the law is a human activity, and its results represent the law of God 
as humanly understood.  Since the law does not descend from 
heaven ready-made, it is the human understanding of the law—the 
human fiqh—that must be normative for society.35 
The founding jurists and scholars of Sharica exercised profound 
acceptance of diversity of opinion because they were highly aware of and 
sensitive to the risks of human error.  At the same time, they promoted 
consensus among themselves and their communities in the interest of 
normative stability by holding that whatever was accepted as valid by 
consensus (ijma) among all jurists (or the wider Muslim community 
according to some jurists) to be permanently binding on subsequent 
generations of Muslims.36  Since the idea of a believer’s consent to the ruling 
is the basis of its binding authority, it is problematic to hold subsequent 
generations bound by the views of earlier Muslims.  Whether the consensus 
is supposed to be of a group of scholars or of the community at large, why 
should the view of one generation bind subsequent generations?  Whatever 
solutions one may find for such conceptual and practical difficulties, that 
answer will itself always be the product of human judgment.  In other words, 
Sharica norms cannot possibly be drawn from the Qur’an and Sunna except 
through human understanding, which necessarily means both the 
inevitability of differences of opinion and the possibility of error, whether 
the matter is decided among scholars or the community in general.37  It is 
remarkable that the founding scholars of Islamic jurisprudence would have 
no difficulty with this idea of the unattainability of certainty because they 
33.  BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 120 (1998). 
 34.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
35.  WEISS, supra note 33, at 116. 
36. Id. at 120–22. 
 37.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
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believed that any human knowledge of Sharica is inherently and permanently 
suppositional (zani), never certain.38 
This religious and historical view raises a major objection for the 
enforcement of Sharica as the law of the state.  The basic dilemma here can 
be explained as follows.  On the one hand, there is the paramount 
importance of a minimum degree of certainty in the determination and 
enforcement of positive law for any society.  The nature and role of positive 
law in the modern state also requires the interaction of a multitude of actors 
and complex factors that cannot possibly be contained by an Islamic 
religious rationale.  This is true of Islamic societies today more than ever 
before because of their growing interdependence with non-Muslim societies 
throughout the world.  On the other hand, a religious rationale is key for the 
binding force of Sharica norms for Muslims.  Precisely because Sharica is 
supposed to be binding on Muslims out of religious conviction, a believer 
cannot be religiously bound except by what that believer personally accepts 
as a valid interpretation of relevant texts of the Qur’an and Sunna.  Yet, 
given the diversity of opinions among Muslim jurists, whatever officials of 
the state elect to enforce as positive law is bound to be deemed an invalid 
interpretation of Islamic sources by some of the Muslim citizens of that 
state.39 
This dilemma has traditionally been mediated by holding that “each 
individual Muslim was absolutely free to follow the school [of 
jurisprudence] of his choice and that any Muslim tribunal was bound to 
apply the law of the school to which the individual litigant belonged.”40 
Accordingly, an individual also had the right to change his or her school of 
law on a particular issue, and litigants selected and submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the judge who would adjudicate their disputes.41  This 
situation continued until the introduction of Al-Majallah by the Ottoman 
Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century and more widely through 
the enactment of family law codes since the 1920s.42   
38.  AVERROES, THE DECISIVE TREATISE DETERMINING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE LAW
AND WISDOM 8–10 (Charles E. Butterworth trans., Brigham Univ. Press 2001). 
 39.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 13–14;. An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive 
Legislation, supra note 1, at 34–35. 
40.  COULSON, supra note 22, at 34. 
41.  KNUT S. VIKØR, BETWEEN GOD AND THE SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 174–80 
(2005).
 42.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 14. 
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  The principle underlying the codes [of Islamic family law] is that 
the political authority has the power, in the interests of uniformity, 
to choose one rule from among equally authoritative variants and to 
order the courts of his jurisdiction to apply that rule to the exclusion 
of all others; and the choice of this rule or that has been made 
simply on grounds of social desirability, the codes embodying those 
variants which were deemed most suited to the present standards 
and circumstances of the community.43 
The imperatives of certainty and uniformity in national legislation are 
now stronger than ever before; this is due not only to the growing com-
plexity of the role of the state at the domestic or national level, but also to 
the global interdependence of all peoples and their states.  Despite the many 
problems of the present national and international systems, the realities of 
national and global political, economic, security and other relations remain 
firmly embedded in the existence of sovereign states that have exclusive 
jurisdiction over their citizens and territories.  For Islamic societies, this 
point has recently been painfully and traumatically emphasized by the eight 
years of the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, the composition of the international 
alliance of Muslim and non-Muslim countries which forced Iraq out of 
Kuwait in 1991, as well as by the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.  
The governments of Muslim-majority countries on both sides of these 
violent conflicts acted (and continue to act) as independent states rather than 
as part of a uniform or united global Islamic community or on behalf of the 
totality of Muslims at large.   
The point here is not that the nature of the state is identical for all 
societies, because the processes of state formation and consolidation vary 
from one country to another.  Rather, my point is that there are certain 
common characteristics that all states need to have in order to be part of the 
present international system because membership is conditional upon 
recognition by other members.  For the states ruling over Islamic societies to 
be and remain accepted as members of the international community, they 
must comply with a recognizable set of minimum features of statehood in 
the present sense of the term.  In particular, the ability to determine and 
enforce the law in everyday life is central to the existence of any state, 
regardless of its philosophical or ideological orientation.  Moreover, as 
explained in the next section, the nature of the state and its present global 
context preclude the possibility of the application of Sharica as historically 
43.  COULSON, supra note 22, at 35–36; An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 15. 
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understood by its founding jurists and still commonly accepted among 
Muslims.44 
All the above objections to the enforcement of Sharica through positive 
law and the notion of an Islamic state do not, of course, preclude Muslims 
from personally conforming by every aspect of Sharica.  The fact that usury 
and speculative contracts (riba and gharar) are not illegal in a given country 
does not mean that Muslims have to engage in these practices.  Any person 
can simply abstain from any form of commercial transaction or personal 
behavior in accordance with his or her own religious or moral convictions.  
The arguments I am making here are against enforcement by the state, not to 
suppress private conformity with the dictates of one’s beliefs.  Indeed, 
people may seek to reinforce the religious or moral values through the 
activities of non-governmental organizations and other agencies of civil 
society.  It is true that legal prohibition will reinforce the authority of reli-
gious norms, but the question is how to ensure the freedom for personal 
religious conformity without violating the rights of others.  Human judgment 
about law and public policy will necessarily have to be made in terms of a 
cost-benefit balance of legal enforcement of any norm, in contrast to other 
ways of promoting the social good.  In the present limited space, I will focus 
on the general framework within which any Islamic text, including the 
Qur’an and Sunna, can influence public policy.45 
The underlying assumption of claims to enforce Sharica through positive 
legislation is that Islamic societies and communities have the right and 
responsibility to organize their public and private lives in accordance with 
the dictates of Islam.  In modern terms, one can say that this is a matter of 
political and cultural self-determination.  But self-determination is not an 
absolute right because the manner in which one group or entity exercises the 
right will have consequences or implications for the rights of others.  In 
particular, all the states of Islamic societies are bound by customary 
international law and humanitarian law, like any other state in the world.  
They are also bound by all the international treaties they have ratified, such 
as the Charter of the United Nations, which is binding on all of them as 
members of that organization.  All of these sources set clear and categorical 
limits on what the states of Islamic societies may or may not do, both within 
their own borders as well as in their dealings with other states and their 
citizens.  As a practical matter, other states do act on these principles in their 
 44.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 15–16; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive 
Legislation, supra note 1, at 35–36. 
 45.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 19. 
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economic, political, security, and other dealings with the states of Islamic 
societies.  Whether it is the organization and operation of the state in 
general, the treatment of vulnerable persons and groups who are their own 
citizens, or the treatment of citizens of other countries, the states of Islamic 
societies are not free to behave as they please.46 
In conclusion of this section, I wish to emphasize that whether in its 
traditional formulation, as known to Muslims today, or through some new or 
modernist elaboration and articulation, Sharica will always remain a 
historically conditioned human understanding of the Qur’an and Sunna of 
the Prophet.  While sharing the belief of Muslims that these sources are 
divine, it is clear to me that their interpretation and expression as Sharica 
norms will always remain a human endeavor, open to challenge and 
reformulation through alternative human efforts. In other words, the divine 
sources of Sharica cannot influence human life and experience except 
through human agency in the understanding and implementation of those 
sources in the specific historical context of Islamic societies.  As indicated 
earlier, this does not mean that Islamic societies are not entitled to realize 
their right to self-determination in terms of an Islamic identity, or that they 
are incapable of achieving that objective.  On the contrary, I believe that 
they do indeed have that right, and can realize it in practice.  For that to 
happen, however, I am suggesting that Islamic societies must categorically 
renounce any commitment to a romantic ideal of an Islamic state that never 
was, and expressly abandon expectations of the enforcement of Sharica as 
such by the state.47 
IV.  PROMOTING COMPLEMENTARITY THROUGH NORMATIVE PLURALISM 
AND LEGAL UNIFORMITY48 
In light of the preceding discussion, I would argue that the nature of 
Sharica as a religious normative system, on the one hand, and of the state and 
state law as secular political institutions, on the other, require clear 
differentiation between the two in theory and separation in practice.  
However, the methodological and normative similarities between Sharica 
and state law, and the fact that they both seek to regulate human behavior, 
raise possibilities of dynamic interaction and cross-fertilization between the 
two.49  For instance, interaction through civic reason, as I will discuss further 
 46.  Id. at 19–20; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive Legislation, supra note 1, at 38–39. 
 47.  An-Nacim, Islam, State and Politics, supra note 1, at 16; An-Nacim, Sharica and Positive 
Legislation, supra note 1, at 36. 
 48.  Substantial portions of Part IV are revised and unrevised excerpts from Abdullahi Ahmed 
An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and 
State Law, 73 MOD. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic]. 
 49.  An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 800. 
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below, can legitimize state law among religious believers, and change how 
Muslims perceive and practice the social aspects of Sharica within the 
framework of the constitutional and human rights obligations of the state.  
Since the enforcement of Sharica through state institutions negates its 
religious nature, the outcome will always be secular, not religious.  As I see 
it, the choice for Muslims regarding legal adjudication and enforcement of 
rights and obligations is between good or bad secular law—by a good or bad 
secular state.  The choice is never between Sharica and secular law because 
Sharica as such cannot be enforced as state law.  The choice cannot be 
between an Islamic and a secular state because it is not possible for the state 
to be “Islamic.”50 
This view does not dispute the religious authority of Sharica, which 
exists only outside the framework of the state.  Sharica is always relevant 
and binding on Muslims, but only as each Muslim believes it to be and not 
as declared and coercively enforced by the state.  For any act to be 
religiously valid, the individual believer must comply voluntarily with the 
necessary pious intent (nya), and without violating the rights of others.  This 
focus on the individual believer is integral to Islam.51  Still, principles of 
Sharica should be relevant to the public discourse, provided the argument is 
made in terms of what I call “civic reason” and not simply by assertions of 
what one believes to be the will of God.  The process of civic reason also 
requires conformity with constitutional and human rights standards in the 
adoption and implementation of public policy and legislation.  All citizens 
must be able to make their own legislative proposal or object to what others 
are proposing through public and fully inclusive public debate, without 
having to challenge each other’s religious convictions.  Moreover, by its 
nature and rationale, civic reason is not limited to Sharica principles; it can 
apply to other religious normative systems as well.  Civic reason and 
reasoning, not personal beliefs and motivation, are necessary whether 
Muslims or members of any other religion or tradition constitute the 
majority or the minority of the population of the state.52 
 50.  An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 2. 
51.  The fundamental principle of individual personal responsibility that can never be abdicated 
or delegated is one of the recurring themes of the Qur’an.  See QUR’AN, supra note 5, at 6:164, 
17:15, 35:18, 39:7, 52:21, 74:38.  On individuality as the core value of Islam, see MAHMOUD
MOHAMED TAHA, THE SECOND MESSAGE OF ISLAM 62–77 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim trans., 
1987).
52.  An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 3; see also AN-NAcIM, ISLAM AND 
THE SECULAR STATE, supra note 3, at 92–101. 
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The mediation of the dialectic of compatibility and incompatibility 
suggests that these two types of relationships can exist between Sharica and 
state law when the two systems apply to the same human subjects, within the 
same space and time.  On the one hand, the premise of my affirmation of the 
incompatibility of the two systems is that Sharica and state law are different 
types of normative systems, each based on its own sources of authority and 
legitimacy.  This does not mean that state law is superior or more effective 
in regulating human behavior than Sharica (or any other nonstate system).  
On the other hand, the possibilities of compatibility can draw on the 
similarities in methodology and normative content of these two systems.  
Moreover, Sharica normally requires and sanctions obedience to state law in 
the interest of public peace and justice, and state law may in turn incorporate 
some principles of Sharica through civic reason and subject to constitutional 
safeguards.   
Possibilities of compatibility are also supported by the fact that Sharica 
and state law are complementary normative systems, rather than by requiring 
either to conform to the nature and role of the other.  The proposed 
mediation of this dialectic is premised on a distinction (not dichotomy) 
between Sharica and state law to avoid confusing the function, operation, and 
nature of outcomes when the two systems coexist in the same space and 
apply to the same human subjects.  If state law enforces a principle of 
Sharica, the outcome is a matter of state law and not Sharica because it does 
not have the religious significance of compliance with a religious obligation.  
Conversely, compliance with Sharica cannot be a legal justification for 
violating state law.  For Sharica and state law to be complementary, instead 
of being in mutually destructive conflict, each system must operate on its 
own terms and within its field of competence and authority.53 
I should emphasize that my argument and analysis are intended to apply 
whether Muslims constitute the predominant majority or a small minority of 
a state’s population.  Recalling the above-noted distinction between religious 
law and state law, I argue that Sharica cannot be enacted into state law and 
remain religious as such—regardless of the religious affiliation of the 
population—but it can influence the development and interpretation of state 
law and contribute to its legitimacy among Muslims.  Egyptian jurist Abdul 
Razeg Al-Sanhouri’s massive codification projects for several Arab 
countries illustrate the potential possibilities of such a synthesis of 
traditional Sharica jurisprudence and modern state law, whereby Sharica 
principles are incorporated into modern legal codes as secular state law, 
rather than Sharica as such.54 
 53.  An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 3–4. 
54.  Id. at 4.  See generally GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURI CODE, AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
MODERN ARAB CIVIL LAW (1932 TO 1949) (2007). 
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For the proposed mediation to work through the legitimate synthesis of 
Sharica and state law, proponents of Sharica must abandon claims that 
Sharica principles can or should be enacted into state law as a matter of 
religious obligation.  Instead, they should advance Sharica as a 
jurisprudential tradition and cultivate their own ability to persuade other 
citizens of the utility and expediency of enacting specific principles of 
Sharica as secular state law.  The basic point, however, is that proponents of 
the enactment of a Sharica norm (like prohibiting charging interest on loans, 
and not in its religious quality as riba) should seek to persuade other citizens 
by giving reasons that all can debate freely, rather than asserting their own 
religious conviction or cultural affiliation as categorical justification.  This 
broader jurisprudential dimension does not imply that Sharica as such can be 
compatible with state law in the sense that the two systems can coexist as 
competing legal systems of any country.  In view of the centralized, 
bureaucratic, and coercive nature of the modern “territorial” state, the 
secular legislative organs of the state must have an exclusive monopoly on 
enacting state law, and secular judicial (and, as appropriate, administrative) 
organs must also have exclusive authority to interpret and apply that law.  At 
the same time, some Sharica norms can be compatible with state law in 
substantive terms through the jurisprudential dimension.  The existence of 
strong similarities between Sharica principles of, for instance, contracts, 
property, and corresponding principles in many modern legal systems should 
facilitate the incorporation of those principles into state law through civic 
reason.55 
To be clear on this point, if individual persons seek religious or any 
other manner of private mediation of their disputes, there is no legitimate 
way for the state to prevent it if the parties comply voluntarily with the 
outcome.  By the same token, however, none of the parties of such 
mediation can resort to state courts for coercive enforcement, as failure to 
voluntarily comply transforms the nature of the process from voluntary 
private mediation to coercively enforced law of the state.56   
The main objective of legal pluralism as an approach is to question the 
focus of legal systems on the law of the centralized state and to recognize 
and legitimatize  
55.  An-Nacim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 4–5; see also WAEL B. HALLAQ,
SHARCA: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 239–45, 296–306 (respectively discussing 
contracts and property) (2009).
 56.  An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 794–95. 
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[T]he informal counter-rules of the patchwork of minorities, the 
quasi-laws of dispersed ethnic, religious, and cultural groups, the 
disciplinary techniques of ‘private justice,’ the plurality of non-State 
laws in associations, formal organizations, and informal 
networks . . . .  Plural, informal, local quasi-laws are seen as the 
“supplement” of the official, formal centralism of the legal order.57  
The main problem is that legal pluralists fail to account for the distinct 
characteristics of the state, as distinguished from other normative systems.58 
Clarifying the distinction, not dichotomy or hierarchy, between state law and 
other “normative systems” may in fact enhance the underlying purpose and 
rationale of legal pluralism by avoiding its confusion of different types of 
regimes.  In other words, a common problem with scholars of legal 
pluralism is the failure to have a comprehensive definition of what they 
mean by “law.”  Social scientists who argue for the concept of legal 
pluralism insist that law is found in the ordering of all kinds of social groups 
and is not limited to official state legal institutions.  Yet, legal pluralists are 
unable to provide a basis by which to determine or delimit what is and what 
is not law. The problem is not just that there is a variety of legal pluralisms 
because they adopt different definitions of law, but also that they are unable 
to distinguish “law” from other forms of normative order.  If we call all 
forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law, “[w]here do we stop 
speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social life?”59 
I agree with this critique of theories that fail to make this distinction, 
because we need to distinguish between compliance with coercive state law 
and behavior out of  religious belief and practice which must necessarily be 
a matter of free conviction and voluntary action.  It is true that states like 
Iran and Saudi Arabia claim to enforce Sharica norms through the coercive 
power of the state; but, a claim is not necessarily true because it is made by 
some political elite in one country or another.  More importantly, whatever 
the state enacts and enforces ceases to be religious by the very fact that the 
state coercively enforces it.  Since religious belief logically requires the 
possibility of disbelief, religious conviction and practice must be a matter of 
choice.  By affirming that “there is no compulsion in religion” (la ikraha fi 
al-din), verse 2:256 of the Qur’an is not only saying that no person should be 
compelled to believe, but is in fact asserting that whatever is coerced is not 
religion at all because of the coercion.  It is therefore necessary to 
57.  Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1443, 1443 (1992). 
58.  Brian Z Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 
SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 391–96 (2008). 
59.  Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 878 (1988); see also An-
Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 795–96. 
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distinguish state law, which is by definition coercively enforced, and 
religious norms, which by definition must be voluntarily observed.   
It is not that every rule of law must be immediately coercively enforced, 
but all legal rules are ultimately supported by the threat of coercive 
enforcement, though that is less likely to happen in successful legal systems.  
In contrast, the normative quality of Sharica principles is derived from a 
religious frame of reference and authority outside state institutions, while 
state law is always the secular political will of the state, and operates in state 
courts and institutions.  Taking an expansive and unrestrained view of the 
terms “law” and “legal” to include norms that are religiously or culturally 
binding will in fact be counterproductive for the purpose of the legal 
pluralism.  This does not mean that state law is superior or more effective 
than other normative systems; but, since the source and authority of state law 
are different from that of religious normative systems, it is confusing to use 
the term “law” for both types of normative systems.60 
As I have previously proposed, state law should be the exclusive legal 
system coercively enforced by the state, while Sharica principles may be 
observed voluntarily among communities of believers without being 
enforced by the state.  A question that may be raised here is how to regulate 
the social practice of Sharica in order to protect the fundamental rights of all 
citizens equally.  If a human rights violation arises through the application of 
state law, the state has the immediate obligation and ability to prevent its 
officials from violating a human rights norm.  The difficulty is when the 
violation arises from the actions of nonstate actors in the context of, for 
instance, a family or community mediation applying the rule that the father 
must always have automatic custody of children regardless of a better claim 
by the mother.  According to current international human rights law, the 
state is not responsible for human rights violations committed by nonstate 
actors, but should exercise due diligence in doing what it can to prevent the 
violation or hold the violator accountable.  As often seen in so-called 
domestic violence cases, it is difficult to hold the state accountable for its 
due diligence obligation when the objectionable conduct happens in the 
privacy of family and community.  Still, I would argue that such risks of 
human rights violations should be addressed through internal reform and 
transformation of the understanding and practice of religious norms, instead 
of the coercive intrusion by the state or other external actor.61 
 60.  An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 796–97. 
61. Id. at 799.  For more on this argument and relevant case studies, see CULTURAL
TRANSFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (Abdullahi Ahmed An-NaCim ed., 2002). 
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The tendency in human rights scholarship, as well as among activists, is 
to assume that a human right is protected simply because there is a law 
affirming the right, or because a few cases have been “won” against 
perpetrators.  In the case of human rights of women, for instance, there is 
little consideration of what happens to the women and children who “win” 
when they return to the privacy of their families and communities.  
Moreover, in the present postcolonial context in particular, state courts will 
do more harm to the rights of women and children than good.62  Most 
women and children are unlikely to seek or be able to obtain protection from 
state courts against their own families and communities, and witnesses are 
unlikely to cooperate with the prosecution in criminal cases.  The 
exceptional few complainants who resort to state protection will be chastised 
by their families and communities, and may struggle for survival because 
they are often dependent on their families and communities.  The idea of 
human rights protection itself will probably be discredited as a neocolonial 
imposition.  In the final analysis, I would rather see gradual change in 
religious norms and social practices that preempt human rights violations 
than a rhetorical appearance of protection by state courts that is neither 
accessible to potential victims nor effective or sustainable in the community 
at large.  I believe this position to be more consistent with a commitment to 
equal human rights than with legal protection that is perceived by the 
victims themselves to be competing with their fidelity to their families and 
communities.63 
To summarize, this Article and my previous works cited herein have 
advocated for Sharica and state law to be complementary normative systems, 
instead of being in mutually destructive conflict, each system must operate 
on its own terms and within its field of competency and authority.  As I see 
it, the proposed compatibility dialectic works as follows.  First, the 
constructive and legitimate relationship of Sharica and state law can be 
promoted by upholding the true nature and purpose of each system.  Sharica 
remains binding on Muslims from a religious point of view, which can only 
be fulfilled through voluntary personal compliance that is undermined by 
futile attempts of coercive enforcement as state law.  That religious 
obligation is fully consistent with—and is indeed facilitated by—the 
religious neutrality of the state and the integrity of its necessarily secular 
law.  The role of state law in facilitating this dialectic relationship is not only 
to protect freedom of religion and other human rights for all citizens, 
62. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REALIZING THE PROMISE
FOR OURSELVES (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim ed., 2003) (discussing the complex limitations on 
what state courts can do to protect human rights, especially of vulnerable groups like women and 
children).
 63.  An-Nacim, Religious Norms, supra note 9, at 799–800. 
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Muslims and non-Muslims equally and without discrimination, but also to 
safeguard the integrity and religious neutrality of the state and state law.64 
Secondly, the role of Sharica in facilitating the dialectic is to support and 
sustain over time this dual role of state law.  For instance, the successful 
mediation of this dialectic needs to be sustained by and intended to facilitate 
internal debate and critical reflection within and among Islamic and other 
religious communities to promote the legitimacy and efficacy of the process 
of dialectic mediation as a whole.  In particular, internal debate and critical 
reflection should also promote a shared understanding of freedom of 
religion, that is consistent with the constitutional and human rights 
obligations of the state, for all citizens, without distinction or discrimination.  
This internally legitimate understanding of freedom of religion is necessary 
for Muslims and other believers to combine a genuine feeling of religious 
compliance with unqualified commitment to abide by state law.65 
 Lastly, it should remain possible for some norms of Sharica to be 
enacted into state law provided this is done through civic reason within the 
framework of constitutionalism, human rights and equal citizenship for all, 
Muslims and non-Muslims, men and women.  While this is imperative for 
the principle of the legality of state law to be enforced by state courts and 
other official institutions, it should remain possible for citizens to engage in 
private consensual mediation of their disputes for exclusively voluntary 
compliance outside state institutions.  Still, the state has the obligation to 
ensure the voluntariness and fairness of such private arrangements as an 
integral part of its general obligation to keep the peace and protect the 
human rights of all citizens.66 
 
 64.  An-Naicim, The Compatibility Dialectic, supra note 48, at 28–29. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 29. 
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